Theoretical perspectives on localised knowledge spillovers and agglomeration by Leppälä, Samuli & Cardiff University
 Cardiff Economics Working Papers 
 
Working Paper No. E2014/10 
Theoretical Perspectives on Localised Knowledge  
Spillovers and Agglomeration 
Samuli Leppälä 
July 2014 
Cardiff Business School 
Aberconway Building 
Colum Drive 
Cardiff CF10 3EU 
United Kingdom 
t: +44 (0)29 2087 4000 
f: +44 (0)29 2087 4419 
business.cardiff.ac.uk 
 
 
This working paper is produced for discussion purpose only. These working papers are expected to be 
publishedin due course, in revised form, and should not be quoted or cited without the author’s written 
permission. 
Cardiff Economics Working Papers are available online from: 
 econpapers.repec.org/paper/cdfwpaper/ and 
business.cardiff.ac.uk/research/academic-sections/economics/working-papers 
Enquiries: EconWP@cardiff.ac.uk 
Theoretical Perspectives on Localised Knowledge
Spillovers and Agglomeration
Samuli Leppa¨la¨
Cardiff University
July 11, 2014
Abstract
There is substantial empirical evidence that innovation is geographi-
cally concentrated. Unlike what is generally assumed, however, it is not
clear that localised knowledge spillovers provide a theoretically valid ex-
planation for this. Studying spillovers of cost-reducing technology between
Cournot oligopolists we show that 1) localised knowledge spillovers of any
level do encourage agglomeration, but 2) whether this leads to higher lev-
els of effective R&D depends on the type and level of knowledge spillovers,
the number of firms, and the industry’s R&D efficiency.
JEL classification: O33, R32, L13.
Keywords: knowledge spillovers, agglomeration economies, innovation, location.
1 Introduction
Following the seminal work by Glaeser et al. (1992), there has been an extensive
number of empirical studies on localised knowledge spillovers.1 As a result, there
is a largely unanimous view that knowledge spillovers are important for innova-
tion and growth and strongly bounded in space (e.g. Do¨ring and Schnellenbach,
2006). Some issues, however, are still unclear such as the role of industrial struc-
ture, as empirical support has been found for both inter- and intra-industrial
knowledge spillovers (Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009). Furthermore, the liter-
ature has been criticised of the lack of a firm theoretical background as well as
direct evidence of spillovers (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001), which are problematic
because there are various potential explanations for agglomeration economies
(see Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). Certain stylised facts have emerged, nev-
ertheless. Most importantly, there is definitive evidence for that innovation is
geographically concentrated (Asheim and Gertler, 2005). The explanation given
1One survey (Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009) and another meta-analysis (De Groot et al.,
2009), alone, scrutinise 67 and 31 of them, respectively.
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to this is that firms agglomerate in order to benefit from knowledge spillovers
that are spatially limited and this leads to higher levels of innovation.
In contrast to empirical research, there has not been much theoretical re-
search on localised knowledge spillovers, notwithstanding the vast industrial or-
ganisation literature on knowledge spillovers since d’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988). Moreover, it is not clear on theoretical basis that firms would choose to
locate in close proximity in order to maximise spillovers and that agglomeration
would lead to higher R&D levels and growth in output without explicit coopera-
tion in R&D. As noted by several authors, among the micro-foundations of urban
agglomeration, learning and knowledge spillovers are the least understood and
advancing theoretical research on localised knowledge spillovers, which informs
empirical research rather than lags behind it, is of urgent necessity (Duranton
and Puga, 2004; Fujita and Krugman, 2004; Puga, 2010).
Only a few papers have considered endogenous, location-dependent spillovers
in the context of Bertrand or Cournot competition (e.g. Van Long and Soubeyran,
1998; Baranes and Tropeano, 2003; Piga and Poyago-Theotoky, 2005; Hussler
et al., 2007). Summarily, they give no uniform theoretical support for urban
agglomeration or higher R&D levels as the consequences of localised knowledge
spillovers. As such, this paper attempts to disclose the theoretical circumstances
that would support the empirical findings. Hence, it is important to go back to
the theoretical models to see whether the explanation for geographically concen-
trated innovation is tenable or needs to be reconsidered. This paper proceeds by
reviewing the existing theoretical literature on knowledge spillovers and location
choice. After having identified the clues that the existing literature can give us
and what remains to be studied, we develop a theoretical model that reveals 1)
whether we can expect localised spillovers to promote to agglomeration, and 2)
under what conditions does agglomeration lead to a higher effective R&D out-
put. In our model we will focus on output spillovers of cost-saving technology
between non-cooperative firms in a Cournot oligopoly. Following the empirical
literature, we assume that the extent of spillovers depends on the spatial prox-
imity between the firms. University-industry spillovers or the specific spillover
mechanisms are not considered.
The focus of previous theoretical research has been different and there is no
clear answer regarding the relationship between localised knowledge spillovers
and agglomeration. Furthermore, the differences between the models require
careful interpretation. Our model shows that agglomeration is always an equi-
librium for any n ≥ 3 firms, irrespective of the level of agglomeration spillovers.
However, agglomeration does not lead to higher effective R&D if the spillovers
are high. The number of firms and industry’s R&D efficiency affects this thresh-
old though, which suggest that different industries benefit more from agglomer-
ation than others. In addition to the level of agglomeration spillovers, concen-
tration, and R&D efficiency, further empirical research could pay more attention
to the type of spillovers and the measure of R&D.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 will review the basic
models of knowledge spillovers and their extensions in the context of location
choice. Building up from these insights, Section 3 presents a Cournot oligopoly
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model that gives an applicable framework for considering the explanation given
to the empirical evidence. Finally, Section 4 summarises the results and provides
suggestions for subsequent research.
2 Literature Review
The effect of knowledge spillovers on firms’ R&D incentives has been addressed
most extensively in the industrial organisation literature studying Cournot
oligopoly models. The two seminal papers in this respect are d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992). The central way how spillovers are
modelled in both papers and subsequent research is illustrated by the equation
for a firm’s effective R&D:
Xi = xi + β
∑
j 6=i
xj ,
where β ∈ [0, 1] is the spillover rate between the firms. The central difference
is that d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) study spillovers in R&D outputs
whereas the spillovers modelled by Kamien et al. (1992) concern R&D inputs.
This means that xi in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) is firm i’s own R&D
output, which together with the spillovers from other firms creates its effective
R&D output, Xi. In Kamien et al. (1992) these are investments in R&D, self-
financed and effective, respectively. In both cases, β = 1 would imply complete
spillovers and β = 0 a situation where there are none. The R&D output is
typically considered to be a cost reduction, but for quality-enhancing R&D the
logic is similar.
Despite the similarities, the outcomes of these models differ in some relevant
respects and in the literature there has been a discussion regarding their relative
merits (see Amir, 2000; Amir et al., 2008). For example, Amir (2000) considers
the additive spillovers of the output spillover model to be less realistic in general,
but notes that these might be appropriate especially when modelling agglomer-
ation economies, which presume such additive benefits. One way to perceive the
difference between the two is whether the firms are developing complementary
technologies or jointly refining the same one2. In both models, the firm’s own
level of R&D, xi, whether input or output, is decreasing in β in the equilibrium.
However, the effective R&D, Xi, is also decreasing in β if the spillovers are in
inputs, but reaches the maximum when β = 0.5 in the case of output spillovers.
De Bondt et al. (1992) later demonstrated that the latter result holds for any
number of firms n. This result also relates to criticism by Breschi and Lissoni
(2001). While they are likely right that the concept of tacit knowledge has been
used ambiguously, spillovers and tacitness as used in the literature might not
be such an odd couple after all. Some degree of imperfection in the spillovers
leads to a higher level of innovation.
The above mentioned results have two main implications for empirical re-
search. First, it is should be important whether the used R&D variable measures
2Note that by construction both models assume away the risk of duplication.
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firm’s self-financed or effective R&D. Second, input spillovers are unlikely the
explanation for the spatial concentration of innovation as in this case higher
spillovers always lead to less R&D. Whether the spillovers are in R&D outputs
or inputs may vary between industries and is ultimately an empirical question.
However, our purpose is merely to test whether the proposed explanation is
logically valid. For this reason, our model follows the approach by d’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988) as it is the more favourable case of the two. Nevertheless,
we expect the level of agglomeration spillovers to play a critical role. Similarly,
we adopt a Cournot model, because in a homogeneous good price competition
spillovers can only decrease the R&D levels.
There have been numerous subsequent papers on knowledge spillovers (see
De Bondt, 1997). Most have concentrated on different forms of R&D cooper-
ation as in the presence of spillovers both the firms and the consumers may
benefit from such cooperation between otherwise rival firms. In the case of
agglomeration economies, however, the high spillover levels are not due to co-
operation but are instead the outcome of non-cooperative location choices3. A
straightforward way to combine knowledge spillovers with location choice has
been to introduce them into the Hotelling (1929) model. There have been a few
papers along these lines, and the equilibrium outcomes vary between agglom-
eration and dispersion depending on the levels of spillovers and transportation
costs (Mai and Peng, 1999; Hussler et al., 2007), product differentiation (Piga
and Poyago-Theotoky, 2005), and R&D cost and technical risk (Li and Zhang,
2013). To summarise, agglomeration is rarely established as the natural out-
come. However, the Hotelling model has two unwanted characteristics consid-
ering our purposes. First, a linear city is unlikely the model that represents the
empirical findings in general. While some empirical research has been done re-
garding cluster formations within cities, most point out to differences between
peripheries and cities with respect to the level of innovation. Second, in the
Hotelling model the location choice also affects the market shares and not only
the spillovers levels. While there are certainly centripetal and centrifugal forces
other than localised knowledge spillovers (see Fujita and Thisse, 1996; Belle-
flamme et al., 2000; Fujita and Krugman, 2004), what we want to establish is
whether or not it is logically true that in the absence of interfering factors these
spillovers provide a reason to agglomerate.
Regarding non-Hotelling approaches, there are two papers studying whether
two firms choose to locate in the same region when this would lead to spillovers.
In Alsleben (2005), labour poaching, if located in the same region, leads the
firms to choose dispersion. A central factor is that knowledge is in this model
embodied in the workers. Hence, knowledge is also lost when ”spilt over” to
the rival. Conversely, in Baranes and Tropeano (2003), choosing the same loca-
tion creates more competition and makes the firms willing to share their R&D.
Knowledge that is fully embodied in human capital or voluntary sharing of
R&D, however, are not what is strictly meant by knowledge spillovers as there
3Proximity may also facilitate cooperation, but Brenner (2007) notes that formal R&D
cooperation has been found rather less important than the other mechanisms of technology
diffusion.
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are no externalities involved (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001).
The last three papers reviewed here are more closely related to our approach.
In these, the firms choose the distance (or the level of technological differenti-
ation) between each other, which then determines the level of spillovers (but
not market shares etc.). In Van Long and Soubeyran (1998), three firms choose
to agglomerate given any level of R&D investments when the (input) spillover
effect is convex in distance. However, this does not tell us how agglomeration
affects the R&D levels, which could then also affect the location choices. In
Gil Molto´ et al. (2005) duopoly model, the R&D levels are endogenous. While
the endogenous (output) spillover level depends on technological differentiation
in their model, the situation is similar if this is caused by the distance be-
tween the firms. They find out that the firms maximise or almost maximise
the spillovers depending on the R&D efficiency and the highest attainable level
of spillovers. They state that this leads to less own R&D propensity, xi, but
not how the effective R&D, Xi, is affected
4. Nevertheless, the duopoly model
is unable to tell whether there is an agglomeration equilibrium with more than
two firms where one firm’s decision to deviate does not affect the spillover levels
between the other firms. Studying a three-firm oligopoly, Mota and Branda˜o
(2004) take a relevant step in this direction. Making the simplifying assump-
tion that the equilibrium R&D levels are identical, however, does not give us
the proper answer as this symmetry cannot be expected to hold if the (output)
spillover levels are not identical. Taking this issue into account and extend-
ing our model to an n-firm Cournot oligopoly, we are able to study whether
agglomeration is an equilibrium and whether it also leads to higher effective
R&D.
3 Model
In this section, we consider a three-stage game between n ≥ 3 Cournot oligopolists
that produce a homogeneous output. The inverse demand function is given by
P = a−Q, where Q = ∑ni=1 qi is the total quantity produced and a > Q ≥ 0.
The unit cost of firm i, i = 1, ..., n, is ci = c−Xi, where c is the initial marginal
cost, Xi is the effective cost reduction due to R&D, and a > c > Xi ≥ 0. Hence,
we assume that marginal costs are always positive.
A firm’s effective R&D output is
Xi = xi +
∑
j 6=i
β(dij)xj .
As in d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), the cost of the firm’s own R&D
output xi is quadratic and given by
C(xi) =
1
2
γx2i ,
4Similarly, the other cited papers have largely concentrated on the issue of agglomeration
alone and not on how it would affect effective R&D
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where γ > 0 is an inverse measure of the efficiency of R&D. We do not explicitly
consider the exact spillover mechanism, but rather assume as in the empirical
literature that the spillovers are decreasing in distance. Hence, the output
spillovers from other firms depend on spillover rate β(dij), which is a positive and
decreasing function of geographical distance dij between firms i and j (i 6= j),
i.e.
0 ≤ β(dij) ≤ β¯ ≤ 1,
and β′(dij) < 0 and β(0) = β¯. For convenience, we denote it by βij = β(dij)
and concentrate on changes in β bearing in mind that they result from changes
in distance.
Agglomeration spillover rate β¯ is the upper bound that can be achieved
through co-location and it can be limited by other factors, such labour mobil-
ity, technological (dis)similarity or intellectual property rights. Likewise, there
could be a lower bound to localised knowledge spillovers as well, but that is
not our concern as we concentrate on the agglomeration case. We assume that
transportation costs and any other costs directly related to the location choice
are zero, which allows us to focus on how localised knowledge spillovers affect
the location choice. This also implies that the results extend to other cases of
endogenous knowledge spillovers (c.f. Gil Molto´ et al., 2005).
The timing of the three-stage game is the following:
1. The firms choose their distance from each other and hence the level of
spillovers, βij , between them.
2. The firms choose their own cost reduction levels, xi.
3. The firms choose their output levels, qi, through Cournot competition.
In each stage the choices are made simultaneously and discounting between
the stages is ignored for expository reasons. We solve the game by backward
induction to see whether agglomeration is a Nash equilibrium and if it maximises
the firm’s effective R&D. As such, we do not consider whether other equilibria
exist and need not make any explicit assumptions regarding the location space,
except that there is at least one dimension, or the concavity of spillovers in
space. Without loss of generality, we assume that all the other firms except
i are agglomerated and concentrate on firm i’s location choice. That is, if
βjk = β¯,∀j, k ∈ {n − i}, j 6= k, and βij = βik = β, then whether β = β¯
maximises firm i’s effective R&D and profit.
3.1 Production Stage
In the production stage, firm i maximises its profit function given by
pii = (a−Q− ci)qi.
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The Cournot equilibrium output is
q∗i =
a− nci +
∑
j 6=i cj
n+ 1
=
a− c+ nXi −
∑
j 6=iXj
n+ 1
(1)
for all firms i ∈ n. The total industry output is
Q =
n(a− c) +∑ni=1Xi
n+ 1
and the consumer surplus is CS = 12Q
2. As expected, there is a positive effect
of R&D on the economic activity and welfare, since ∂Q/∂Xi > 0.
3.2 R&D Investment Stage
In stage 2, the firms choose their R&D levels. Given the subsequent output
levels, firm i chooses xi in order to maximise
pii = (q
∗
i )
2 − 1
2
γx2i ,
where q∗i is given by equation (1). Assuming βjk = β¯ and βij = βik = β, since
we concentrate on the agglomeration equilibrium, the first order condition gives
the best-response function
xi(xj) =
2(a− c+ (nβ − (n− 2)β¯ − 1)∑j 6=i xj)(n− (n− 1)β)
γ(n+ 1)2 − 2(n− (n− 1)β)2 (2)
for firm i. This shows us that the R&D outputs xj are strategic substitutes to
xi if nβ − (n− 2)β¯ − 1 < 0 and complements if the inequality is reversed.
Similarly, the best response function for the other firms is
xj(xi, xk) =
2(a− c+ (2β − 1)xi + (3β¯ − β − 1)
∑
xk)(n− β − (n− 2)β¯)
γ(n+ 1)2 − 2(n− β − (n− 2)β¯)2
(3)
∀j, k ∈ {n−i}, j 6= k. Hence, the R&D output xi is a strategic substitute to xj if
β < 1/2, and xj and xk are strategic substitutes to each other if 3β¯−β−1 < 0.
The second order conditions in the R&D stage require that the numerators
in the best response functions are positive. This holds for all β, β¯ ∈ [0, 1]
when γ > 2n2/(n+ 1)2. The stability condition requires that the best response
functions cross correctly (Henriques 1990), and this holds ∀β, β¯ ∈ [0, 1] when
γ > 2n(2n− 1)/(n+ 1)2.
We assume that firms j 6= i make a symmetric choice: x−i. Then using
the best response functions (2) and (3) we get the following equilibrium R&D
output levels:
x∗i = 2(a− c)(n− (n− 1)β)
A
C
(4)
and
x∗−i = 2(a− c)(n− β − (n− 2)β¯)
D
C
(5)
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where
A = (n+ 1)γ − 2(β¯ − 1)(β − β¯)n2 + ((8β + 6)β¯ − 8β¯2 − 2β2 − 2β − 2)n
+2β + 8β¯2 − (8β + 4)β¯ + 2β2,
C = (8n− 4n2 − 4)β4 + ((16β¯ − 4)n2 − 20β¯n+ (4− 4β¯)n3 + 8β¯)β3
+((2n− 2n3)γ + 8β¯ − 4 + (4− 4β¯)n+ (4− 8β¯)n2 + (4β¯ − 4)n3)β2
+((12β¯ − 20β¯2 − 4)n2 + ((6− 2β¯)n3 − 12β¯ + 4 + 8β¯n2 + (2− 2β¯)n)γ
+(4β¯2 − 4β¯)n3 − 16β¯2 + 8β¯ + (32β¯2 − 12β¯)n)β + (n3 + 3n2 + 3n+ 1)γ2
+((4β¯2 − 4β¯ − 2)n3 + 16β¯2 + (8β¯ − 12β¯2 − 6)n2 + (4β¯ − 4)n− 8β¯)γ
+(16β¯2 − 12β¯ + 4)n2 + (4β¯ − 4β¯2)n3 + (8β¯ − 16β¯2)n,
and
D = (n+ 1)γ − 2n+ (2− 2n)β2 + (4n− 2)β.
Interior and positive solutions for R&D outputs, in particular that A > 0, are
guaranteed for γ > (n+ 1)/2,∀β, β¯ ∈ [0, 1]. We make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 γ > (n+ 1)/2.
The equilibrium R&D outputs result to effective cost cost reductions Xi =
x∗i + β(n − 1)x∗−i and X−i = (1 + β¯(n − 2))x∗−i + βx∗i . The marginal effect of
spillovers on firm i’s effective R&D is given by
∂Xi
∂β
= 2(a− c)
(
n− (n− 1)β
C2
(
∂A
∂β
C −A∂C
∂β
)
− (n− 1)A
C
+
β(n− 1)(n− β − (n− 2)β¯)
C2
(
∂D
∂β
C −D∂C
∂β
)
+(n− 1)(n− 2β − (n− 2)β¯)D
C
)
,
with
∂A
∂β
= (2− 2β¯)n2 + (8β¯ − 4β − 2)n+ 4β − 8β¯ + 2,
∂C
∂β
= (4β¯2 + (8β − 12β2 − 2γ − 4)β¯ + 12β2 − (4γ + 8)β + 6γ)n3
+((48β2 − 16β + 8γ + 12)β¯ − 20β¯2 − 16β3 − 12β2 + 8β − 4)n2
+(32β¯2 − (60β2 + 8β + 2γ + 12)β¯ + 32β3 + (4γ + 8)β − 2γ)n
−16β¯2 + (24β2 + 16β − 12γ + 8)β¯ − 16β3 − 8β + 4γ,
and
∂D
∂β
= (4− 4n)β + 4n− 2,
which brings us to our first proposition.
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Proposition 1 Agglomeration leads to higher effective R&D when the agglom-
eration spillovers are moderate, i.e. β¯ ≤ βˆ where βˆ ∈
(
n−1
n+1 ,
n−1
n
)
, ∂βˆ/∂γ > 0.
Proof. When agglomerated, the marginal effect of localised knowledge spillovers
on firm i’s effective R&D is non-negative if
∂Xi
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β→β¯
=
2γ(a− c)(n2 − 1)f(n, γ, β¯)
((n+ 1)γ − (2n− 2)β¯2 + (4n− 2)β¯ − 2n)E ≥ 0 (6)
where
f(n, γ, β¯) = (1− β¯)(2β¯2 − 2β¯ + γ)n3 + (1− 2β¯)(16β¯ − 10β¯2 − 6 + γ)n2
+(56β¯2 − 34β¯3 − (γ + 30)β¯ + 6− γ)n+ 16β¯3 − 18β¯2 + 6β¯ − γ
and
E = ((2β¯2 − 2β¯ + γ)n2 + (4β¯ − 4β¯2 + 2γ − 2)n+ 2β¯2 − 2β¯ + γ)2
Clearly, both E > 0 and 2γ(a − c)(n2 − 1) > 0. Given Assumption 1, also
(n + 1)γ − (2n − 2)β¯2 + (4n − 2)β¯ − 2n is always positive. Hence, the sign of
equation (6) depends on the sign of f(n, γ, β¯).
Since f(n, γ, 0) = (n− 1)(n2γ+ 2nγ− 6n+γ) > 0, given Assumption 1, and
f(n, γ, (n − 1)/n) = −4(2n − 1)(n − 1)(n − 2)2/n3 < 0, there is at least one βˆ
such that f(n, γ, βˆ) = 0. Furthermore, ∂f/∂γ = (n + 1)2(n − 1 − β¯n) ≥ 0 iff
β¯ ≤ (n− 1)/n. As
∂f
∂β¯
= −6(n− 8)(n− 1)2β¯2 + 4(n− 1)(2n− 1)(n− 9)β¯ − n(n+ 1)2γ
−2n3 + 28n2 − 30n+ 6
and γ > (n+1)/2, the discriminant of this quadratic function is negative for n >
8. As the leading coefficient is then also negative, this implies that ∂f/∂β¯ < 0
if n > 8. Also for n = 8, ∂f/∂β¯ < −2383− 420β¯ < 0. For n ∈ [3, 7], the leading
coefficient is positive and the roots of the quadratic function are given by
β¯ =
1
6
4n2 − 38n±√−3n5 + 19n4 + 23n3 + 133n2 + 132n+ 36 + 18
(n− 8) (n− 1) .
The larger root is greater than 1 when n ∈ [3, 7] and the smaller root is less
than 0 when n ∈ [4, 7]. Therefore, ∂f/∂β¯ < 0 if n > 3. For n = 3, ∂f/∂β¯ < 0
if β¯ ≥ 0.07805. This implies that for n = 3, βˆ is bounded above at 2/3. By the
implicit function theorem,
∂β¯
∂γ
= −∂f/∂γ
∂f/∂β¯
=
8
3
3β¯ − 2
20β¯2 − 40β¯ − 8γ + 19 ≥ 0
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if β¯ ∈ [0.07805, 2/3]. Hence, we conclude that there is always exactly one βˆ. Its
higher bound is (n− 1)/n, and the lower bound is given by
f
(
n,
n+ 1
2
, βˆ
)
= −2(n− 8)(n− 1)2βˆ3 + 2(n− 1)(2n− 1)(n− 9)βˆ2
−1
2
(n4 + 7n3 − 53n2 + 61n− 12)βˆ + 1
2
(n− 1)(n3 + 3n2 − 9n+ 1) = 0.
Since
f
(
n,
n+ 1
2
,
n− 1
n+ 1
)
=
(n− 1)(n5 + 5n4 − 26n3 + 178n2 − 287n+ 81)
2(n+ 1)3
> 0,
the lower bound is greater than (n− 1)/(n+ 1).
(Remark: Several parts of both proofs rely on the positivity or negativity
of polynomial functions of n, which is not always explicitly shown for the sake
of brevity. One can confirm these cases by using any method for finding the
bounds of (real and positive) polynomial roots. Computationally simpler meth-
ods, such as Cauchy’s, might not always be tight enough such that all n ≥ 3
can initially be seen to lie outside the bound. In such a case, one can proceed
by individually confirming the positivity or negativity of the function for the
remaining integers.)
Proposition 1 shows that for low to medium spillovers firm i’s effective
R&D is higher if it is agglomerated with the other firms. If the agglomeration
spillovers are high, however, it could increase its effective R&D by not agglom-
erating with the other firms. In this case the increase in the R&D propensities
would compensate for the lower spillovers. When this effect takes place de-
pends on the number of firms, n, which provides a moving window for the
critical spillover rate. The larger the number firms, the higher the agglomera-
tion spillovers that would still increase the firm’s effective R&D. Intuitively, n
affects both the quantity of spillovers that a firm can enjoy as well as how much
strategic effect its agglomeration decision has on the R&D choices of the other
firms. Perhaps surprisingly, the critical level of spillovers is higher for n ≥ 3
firms than in the standard model (c.f. De Bondt et al., 1992). However, the
meaning of βˆ is different. Instead of measuring the common spillover rate that
maximises every firms’ effective R&D, it provides an important counterfactual
condition. That is, after what spillover rate would a firm enjoy a higher effective
R&D outside the agglomeration. As such, it still holds that the highest effective
R&D for the agglomerated industry as a whole is gained when the agglomeration
spillovers are exactly one half.
To some extent, the effect of agglomeration spillovers depends on R&D cost-
efficiency, which determines the critical spillover rate within the window. A
larger γ brings the critical rate closer to the upper bound, in which case higher
agglomeration spillovers are better for effective R&D due to the cost savings.
The magnitude of this effect is small, however, and this is partly a consequence
of Assumption 1. By approximating the bounds for some values of n:
n = 3→ βˆ ∈
(
0.6498,
2
3
)
, n = 5→ βˆ ∈
(
0.7796,
4
5
)
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n = 10→ βˆ ∈
(
0.8930,
9
10
)
, n = 25→ βˆ ∈
(
0.9592,
24
25
)
,
we see that they tend to be very close to each other. γ having only a small
effect, we can say that in general the critical spillover rate takes place slightly
before (n− 1)/n.
3.3 Location Choice Stage
Even if high agglomeration spillovers imply smaller effective R&D, the last part
is to check the range of spillovers for which agglomeration is an equilibrium
outcome. That is, for what levels of β¯ is agglomeration a Nash equilibrium. As
earlier, we assume that all the other firms are agglomerated and concentrate
on firm i’s decision. Given the anticipated outcome of stages 2 and 3, and the
equilibrium cost reductions (4) and (5), firm i’s profit function in stage 1 is now
pii =
(a− c+ nXi − (n− 1)X−i)2
(n+ 1)2
− 1
2
γ(x∗i )
2
=
(a− c+ (n− (n− 1)β)x∗i + (n− 1)(nβ − (n− 2)β¯ − 1)x∗−i)2
(n+ 1)2
− 1
2
γ(x∗i )
2.
The first order condition with respect to β is
∂pii
∂β
=
2(a− c+ (n− (n− 1)β)x∗i + (n− 1)(nβ − (n− 2)β¯ − 1)x∗−i)2
(n+ 1)2
×
(
(n− (n− 1)∂x
∗
i
∂β
− (n− 1)x∗i + (n− 1)(nβ − (n− 2)β¯ − 1)
∂x∗−i
∂β
+n(n− 1)x∗−i
)
− γx∗i
∂x∗i
∂β
with
∂x∗i
∂β
= 2(a− c)
(
n− (n− 1)β
C2
(
∂A
∂β
C −A∂C
∂β
)
− (n− 1)A
C
)
and
∂x∗−i
∂β
= 2(a− c)
(
n− β − (n− 2)β¯)
C2
(
∂D
∂β
C −D∂C
∂β
)
+
D
C
)
.
This brings us to our final proposition.
Proposition 2 Agglomeration is an equilibrium outcome for n firms given any
level of agglomeration spillovers β¯.
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Proof. Agglomeration is an equilibrium, when the marginal profit of agglom-
eration spillovers is non-negative, i.e.
∂pii
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β→β¯
=
4(n− 1)γ(a− c)2h(n, γ, β¯)
((n+ 1)γ + (2− 2n)β¯2 + (4n− 2)β¯ − 2n)G ≥ 0 (7)
where
G = ((2β¯2 − 2β¯ + γ)n2 − (4β¯2 − 4β¯ − 2γ − 2)n+ 2β¯2 − 2β¯ + γ)3
and
h(n, γ, β¯) = (1− β¯)(2β¯2 − 2β¯ + γ)(4β¯ − 2β¯2 + γ − 2)n5
−(28β¯5 − 100β¯4 + 136β¯3 − (2γ + 88)β¯2 + (γ2 + 28)β¯ − 2γ2 + 2γ − 4)n4
+(72β¯5 − 208β¯4 + (20γ + 216)β¯3 − (42γ + 96)β¯2 + (26γ + 16)β¯ + γ2 − 6γ)n3
−(88β¯5 − 184β¯4 + (20γ + 120)β¯3 − (10γ + 24)β¯2 + (4γ2 − 10γ)β¯ − γ2 + 4γ)n2
+(52β¯5 − 64β¯4 − (20γ − 16)β¯3 + 44β¯2γ − (7γ2 + 18γ)β¯ + 2γ2 + 2γ)n
(2β¯3 − 3β¯γ + 1γ)(2β¯ − 6β¯2 + γ).
Clearly, 4(n−1)γ(a−c)2 > 0. Given Assumption 1, also (n+1)γ+(2−2n)β¯2 +
(4n − 2)β¯ − 2n and G are always positive. Hence, the sign of equation (7)
depends on the sign of h(n, γ, β¯).
At the end points,
h(n, γ, 0) = (γ2−2γ)n5+(2γ2−2γ+4)n4+(γ2−6γ)n3+(γ2−4γ)n2+(2γ2+2γ)n+γ2
> h(n, γ, 1) = γ2n4+(γ2−2γ)n3−(3γ2+4γ)n2−(5γ2−8γ−4)n−2γ2+10γ−8 > 0,
given Assumption 1. β¯ = 1 is not the argument that minimises h(n, γ, β¯), only
if h(n, γ, β¯) is convex downward.
The second derivative of h(n, γ, β¯) is:
∂2h
∂2β¯
= 4(n− 1)((20n4 − 120n3 + 240n2 − 200n+ 60)β¯3
−(48n4−252n3+372n2+180n−12)β¯2+(36n4−168n3+30n2γ+156n2−24n−30γ)β¯
−n4γ − 8n4 + 36n3 − 21n2γ − 12n2 − 16nγ + 6γ) ≡ h′′.
Since
∂h′′
∂γ
= −4(n2 − 1)(n3 − n2 − 30nβ¯ + 22n+ 30β¯ − 6) < 0,
h′′ < 2(n− 1)(40(n− 3)(n− 1)3)β¯3 − 24(4n2 − 13n+ 1)(n− 1)2β¯2
+6(n− 1)(12n3 − 39n2 + 18n+ 5)β¯ − n5 − 17n4 + 51n3 − 61n2 − 10n+ 6 ≡ h¯′′,
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where γ = (n + 1)/2. When n = 3, h¯′′ becomes a quadratic function that is
always negative:
h¯′′ = 768β¯2 + 1536β¯ − 3264 < 0.
h¯′′ is also negative at both end points:
β¯ = 0→ h¯′′ = −2(n− 1)(n5 + 17n4 − 51n3 + 61n2 + 10n− 6) < 0,
β¯ = 1→ h¯′′ = −2(n− 1)(n5 + n4 − 9n3 − 17n2 + 128n− 72) < 0.
Differentiating h¯′′ with respect to β¯ gives a quadratic equation,
∂h¯′′
∂β¯
= 12(n−1)2(20(n−3)(n−1)2β¯2−8(4n2−13n+1)(n−1)β¯+12n3−39n2+18n+5,
(8)
with solutions
β¯ =
8n2 − 26n±√∆ + 2
10 (n− 3) (n− 1) . (9)
For n ∈ [4, 8], the discriminant,
∆ = 4n4 − 41n3 + 33n2 + 141n+ 79,
is negative and h¯′′ has no local maximum. Since the leading coefficient of equa-
tion (8) is positive for n > 3, the local maximum for n > 8 is given by the
smaller value of equation (9). At this point h¯′′ is
− 2(n− 1)
25(n− 3)2 (25n
7 − 141n6 + 96n5 − (12
√
∆− 406)n4 + (123
√
∆ + 261)n3
−(99
√
∆ + 981)n2 − (423
√
∆ + 1854)n+ ∆
3
2 − 237
√
∆− 884).
and decreasing in ∆, and therefore less than
− 2(n− 1)
25(n− 3)2 (25n
7− 141n6 + 96n5 + 406n4 + 261n3− 981n2− 1854n− 884) < 0.
Since h′′ < h¯′′ < 0, h(γ, β¯) is concave and always positive as is then the marginal
profit of agglomeration spillovers.
Proposition 2 means that agglomeration is always a possible outcome, ir-
respective of the level of spillovers it yields. In the absence of any offsetting
factors, this outcome holds for any n ≥ 3. Due to Proposition 1 this also means
that agglomeration, while an equilibrium outcome, cannot always be expected
to yield higher effective R&D. While it is intuitive that a firm prefers to agglom-
erate when this implies higher effective R&D, it is less so when that does not
happen. However, a location outside the agglomeration would then imply less
spillovers and more investment in R&D and it is therefore always profitable to
be agglomerated when the other firms are. As such, the level of agglomeration
spillovers, the number of firms, as well as R&D cost-efficiency play an important
role in whether localised knowledge spillovers explain the spatial concentration
of innovation. Since these are likely to vary between industries, subsequent em-
pirical research could pay more attention to them. Furthermore, these factors
may help to explain the observed differences between industries (Do¨ring and
Schnellenbach, 2006; De Groot et al., 2009).
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4 Conclusion
The explanation given to the found pattern of geographically concentrated in-
novation has been localised knowledge spillovers. Here we have analysed the
theoretical validity of this explanation in the context of Cournot oligopolists.
Indeed, it holds that agglomeration is an equilibrium outcome. However, it is
not always the case that agglomeration will then imply higher effective R&D
for these firms.
Regarding the incentive to agglomerate, it is higher for three or more firms
than two (Gil Molto´ et al., 2005) as then the firms would choose to agglomer-
ate no matter what the level of agglomeration spillovers is, even if a very high
one. This result suggest that localised knowledge spillovers create even stronger
centripetal force when the industry size increases. Agglomeration is then more
likely even in the presence of other, centrifugal forces. It is important to note
that while we considered localised knowledge spillovers in the absence of other
factors, we also concentrated on the existence of the agglomeration equilibrium
and not its uniqueness. Further theoretical work could consider the existence
of other equilibria or sequential entry into the market, which could lead to
interesting asymmetries. In addition, our model examined only a single in-
dustry, whereas the empirical research has also considered spillovers between
different co-located industries. As such, there is further theoretical work to be
done regarding inter-industrial spillovers and the effect of the regional industrial
structure.
Importantly, the findings highlight issues for empirical research to pay at-
tention to. We know from the previous theoretical research that the type of
spillovers and how R&D is measured is likely to be very important. In this
paper we have also explored how the R&D costs (or efficiency), the number of
firms, and the level of agglomeration spillovers affect the effective R&D that the
firms gain. All of these are likely to vary between different industries and tech-
nologies and present interesting hypotheses for subsequent empirical research to
test.
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